For the United States to commit in advance to taking the side of another country involved in an international conflict is an extraordinary step that is justified only under extraordinary circumstances.
There must be a credible external threat to the protected country. And there must be sufficient commonality of interests and values between the United States and the protectorate that the difference between whether or not the nation succumbs to external invasion is of great importance to U.S. interests.
A possible standard for measuring the adequacy of security commitments is the United States’ most ambitious commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty. Whatever one thinks of NATO’s subsequent expansion and extraterritorial activities, the circumstances that justified U.S. security involvement existed when the alliance was created in the late 1940s. Soviet troops took control of Eastern Europe, turning the countries into satellite communist dictatorships. If the then-fragile democracies of Western Europe had suffered the same fate, the outcome would have been disastrous for U.S. interests.
Currently, nothing resembling such a situation exists in the Persian Gulf region. There is no Red Army attempting to occupy this area. There is no entity aiming for regional hegemony. This is certainly not the case with Iran, weakened by sanctions, preoccupied with internal divisions, and facing the disadvantages of being an ethnic and religious minority in a predominantly Arab and Sunni region.
Saudi Arabia is the most recent state to venture closer to regional hegemony. It has used military force outside its borders to prop up the unpopular government in Bahrain, and has also sought to impose its will on Yemen through massive and highly destructive air combat. That attempt failed, and Riyadh apparently came to realize that its security came from accommodation rather than from seeking control.
The region also lacks the differences in values and interests that existed between Western democracies and Soviet satellite dictatorships in Europe in the 1940s. The Gulf Arab states are absolute monarchies. The only semblance of democracy in these states is Kuwait’s elected National Assembly, which is easily disbanded by the ruler when it becomes too noisy and no longer compatible with the ruling system. .
Despite this, the Biden administration has expanded its security efforts to include Gulf states, recently signing the Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement with Bahrain. The agreement provides that the United States shall determine that Bahrain “in the event of external invasion or threat of external aggression,” “determine the need for additional defense, and provide appropriate defense and deterrence as determined.” “We are committed to meeting immediately at the most senior level to develop and implement a response, including in the economic, military, and/or political realms,” regulated by the Parties. ”
Anonymous administration officials went out of their way to point out that the deal is not a treaty and therefore does not require approval by the U.S. Senate. But apparently aiming for a two-way agreement, officials also said the deal is “legally binding.”
No effort has been made to identify what kind of external invasion the parties have in mind. Of course, Iran is the country that automatically comes up as a possible threat. But the image of Iran assembling a D-Day-like invasion fleet and crossing the Gulf to conduct an amphibious invasion of Bahrain is too fanciful and absurd (as U.S. warships would have been in the Gulf). Regardless of whether it was there or not).
Bahrain certainly has its differences with Iran, and perhaps at least as many with other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Historical baggage in this relationship includes old Iranian claims to Bahrain as Iran’s “14th province,” but in recent decades Iran has not sought to act on such claims. This situation is completely different from, for example, the situation surrounding Taiwan. On Taiwan, China constantly declares to the world that it considers Taiwan to be part of China, and regularly sounds military sabers to advertise a possible invasion.
To the extent that the Bahraini regime faces a security threat, it has to do with internal conflict stemming from an unpopular Sunni regime that oppresses a largely Shiite population, rather than external aggression. . The Saudi military intervention in Bahrain in 2011 was aimed at helping the Bahrain regime suppress the Arab Spring-era popular uprisings.
Government repression and popular dissatisfaction continue. This year, prisoners in Bahrain went on a months-long hunger strike to protest harsh prison conditions. The hunger strike was called off after the government eased some conditions on the eve of the crown prince’s visit to Washington to sign a new security agreement. However, Bahrain remains a serious human rights violator.
The unlikely possibility of an external invasion of Bahrain means that the new agreement’s provisions governing responses to such an invasion will likely not be triggered. The shortcomings of this agreement are primarily in two other areas. One is to engage more deeply with the repressive regime, with all its implications regarding the image and relations of the United States with Bahraini people in particular and Shiites in general.
Many of Bahrain’s domestic and foreign critics are reportedly angry and disappointed with the deal. The director of the UK-based Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy said Bahraini authorities would interpret the agreement as a “green light” to step up political repression.
Another major negative effect of this agreement is that it reverses and undermines the beneficial trend towards reducing international tensions in the Persian Gulf region. Bahrain’s other GCC members are all moving toward warmer, less confrontational relations with Iran. Kuwait and Oman have long had business-like relations with the Iranian government, sometimes acting as diplomatic intermediaries with other countries. The same goes for Qatar, which is working with Iran to develop a huge gas field.
Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates has improved relations with Tehran, and Saudi Arabia and Iran exchanged ambassadors this month in fulfillment of an agreement to restore diplomatic relations earlier this year.
The issue of conflict and reconciliation with Iran is intertwined with a larger game that the Biden administration is playing, of which the Bahrain deal is only one part. “We look forward to using this agreement as a framework for additional countries that wish to participate in strengthening regional stability, economic cooperation, and innovation,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said at the signing ceremony.
The additional country that the administration clearly has most in mind is Saudi Arabia, which is seeking security ties with the United States as part of the price it is demanding in exchange for upgrading its already important relationship with Israel to full diplomatic relations. Guarantee agreements have been identified. The administration clearly hopes that the agreement with Bahrain will serve as a model for a deal that meets Saudi demands while avoiding possible opposition on Capitol Hill.
Despite the administration’s efforts to broker a deal to improve relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, it remains unclear how such a deal would serve U.S. interests or the cause of peace and stability in the Middle East. Not explained. In fact, neither will happen and, in fact, it will only prolong and even increase conflict and instability in the region. To understand why, look at Israel’s main objective in seeking to exchange embassies and ambassadors with Persian Gulf Arab states that are not at war.
One of the objectives is to intensify the confrontation with Iran, institutionalize fear and hatred of Iran, thereby maintaining Iran as a “despicable country” that can be held responsible for all problems in the region, and intensifying the conflict with Israel. It is to divert the attention of the international community from all issues related to action. This means tensions and risks in the Persian Gulf region will increase, not reduce. And that’s before considering the Saudi regime’s further compensation for improved relations with Israel, such as more unrestricted arms sales and support for the kingdom’s nuclear program.
Another objective of Israel is to demonstrate that it can enjoy normal relations with regional countries while continuing its occupation of Palestinian areas. Far from a “peace” agreement, improving relations with Saudi Arabia will be about Israel, similar to previous improvements with Bahrain, Morocco and the UAE. do not have to make peace with the Palestinians.
Any gesture towards the Palestinians that Riyadh and Washington can squeeze out of Israel will be almost impossible given the far-right nature of the Israeli government, led by a prime minister determined to maintain a coalition government and avoid prosecution for corruption. . It’s more of a gesture. It is inconceivable that the current Israeli government will take any substantive action that would bring it closer to a Palestinian state or any other solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
In short, the administration’s plans to improve Arab-Israeli relations are unjustified. Therefore, the agreement with Bahrain, which is part of that project, will also not be reached.
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