Last month, the United States announced Operation Prosperity Guardian, a naval coalition aimed at thwarting Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Bahrain was the only Arab country to participate. It should be interesting to us why that is, and why other US allies and partners in the region have not done so.
Many countries have legitimate concerns about the further regionalization of the war in Gaza. The Houthis have targeted Israeli-owned commercial vessels and commercial ships heading to Israeli ports with missile and drone attacks, and say they have already hijacked ships. They have vowed to continue these attacks until Israel agrees to a ceasefire.
The United States has thwarted most of these attacks with naval-based missile defenses.
The Red Sea security crisis has many economic implications at stake. Separating the Arabian Peninsula from the Horn of Africa is the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea. About 30 percent of all containers in the world pass through the Bab el-Mandeb and Suez Canal, as well as about 12 percent of all global trade.
But since Houthi attacks began in the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden in October, major shipping companies have halted transit through the Suez Canal and rerouted ships around Africa, threatening to increase consumer prices. There is. This disruption to Red Sea trade could have a serious negative impact on economies across Europe, which were already shrinking before the crisis.
Operation Prosperity Guardian
It is significant that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the two main countries in the Arab military coalition that began fighting the Houthis in 2015, did not participate in Operation Guardian. be. Also noteworthy is the fact that Egypt, a major Arab country with a 930-mile Red Sea coast, also refused to participate.
Most Arab countries have avoided formal participation in Operation Prosperity Guardian for several reasons. First, Arab communities are outraged by Israel’s indiscriminate bombing of the Gaza Strip, forced starvation, and forced displacement of millions of Palestinians, so governments in the region are clearly funding and arming the Gaza Strip. They don’t want to be seen as openly complicit in siding with Washington. Israeli strategy.
Second, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have no intention of provoking a renewed Houthi attack on energy or civilian infrastructure or further destabilizing the Red Sea, where much of Saudi Arabia’s vision is enshrined. You want to avoid actions that might cause you to The 2030 project does exist. Third, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi fear that joining the security initiative could erode tensions with Iran, which backs the Houthi movement.
Bahrain’s unique position
Bahrain, which the George W. Bush administration recognized as a major non-NATO ally in 2002, had a different calculation. An important factor to remember is that Bahrain is home to the US Navy’s 5th Fleet. Bahrain and the United States also signed a strategic security and economic agreement, the Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement, in September.
“Bahrain has long recognized an existential threat from Iran that shapes its security posture. Therefore, by providing a home for U.S. assets, Bahrain exceeds the security it receives from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. and gain protection and relevance,” Stephen said. Wright, an associate professor of international relations at Hamad bin Khalifa University, said in an interview with Responsible Statecraft.
“Other GCC states appear to be making more complex calculations. For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, existing efforts to de-escalate tensions with Iran explain their position,” he added. Ta.
Joseph A. Keshichan, a senior fellow at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh, said Bahrain has one guided-missile frigate and two small guided-missile ships called corvettes, but these assets cannot be used in this project. He pointed out that he was not dispatched to participate in the mission. There is no enforcement, at least not yet.
“The Netherlands and Australia have announced that they will send troops but not ships, so Manama’s contribution may be similar to Amsterdam or Canberra.” “However, since Bahrain is the headquarters of the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet and is also home to the Combined Maritime Forces, which coordinates combined operations in the region, Saudi Arabia would be willing to participate if it were just to provide and receive actual intelligence.” “It makes sense to do that” strategy. ”
He indicated that other Gulf Cooperation Coalition (GCC) countries would share information on the new task force, but it was unclear how that would be done. “As far as is known, Saudi Arabia and the UAE could have sent naval vessels, but they chose not to participate in Operation Prosperity Guardian because they disagree with its narrow objectives,” Keshishian added.
Since October 7 Blowback in Bahrain
Bahrain, which normalized diplomatic relations with Israel in 2020, has been in an awkward position since October 7. When it comes to relations with Israel, there is a huge rift between Bahraini’s leadership and its people. This division deepened during the Gaza conflict.
As the death toll for Palestinians in Gaza steadily rises, Bahraini authorities are wary of the risk of a backlash domestically, given the unpopularity of the Abraham Accords across the country’s political spectrum and among diverse civil society groups. have to deal with the increase in As recently documented by Human Rights Watch, Bahraini authorities are using repressive tactics to suppress Palestinian Solidarity protesters across the country.
“The Al-Khalifa monarchy has proven historically adept at quashing dissent through a variety of means. “It’s clearly calculated to serve economic, foreign policy and security interests,” Wright said.
“The bottom line is that economic benefits and U.S. support outweigh public opposition from domestic political groups,” Wright said.
Courtney Freer, a fellow at Emory University, told RS that Bahrain’s House of Representatives issued a statement in November claiming that the country’s ambassador had left Israel, severing economic ties between the two countries.
“It is noteworthy that this language emanated primarily from a loyalist parliament, suggesting that such hostility towards Israel does not only concern the opposition. “This can in turn make it more difficult to ignore,” Freer said. “Notably, there is anger as civilians are drawn into pro-Palestinian protests, but it is unclear whether this anger will translate into political risk for the regime.”
Bahrain’s diplomatic ties with Israel and military alliance with the United States could expose the archipelago kingdom to blowback from regional Iranian-aligned powers. However, it is highly unlikely that Bahrain will abandon the Abraham Accords or fundamentally change its relationship with Washington. In the end, Bahraini leadership appears to have assessed the risk of such a counterattack as being worth the benefits of normalized relations with Israel and American support.
“The Al-Khalifa monarchy has proven adept at managing domestic dissent through a variety of means, and the risk from Iran in this situation would be considered manageable. “Public concerns about Israeli/US cooperation are unlikely to seriously impact its stability and are likely to be limited in scale at best,” Wright said.
“Basically, Bahrain is trying to engage with the United States by supporting the anti-Houthi maritime initiative,” he added. “Given that this is part of our approach to countering the geopolitical influence of the Houthis and Iran, this will allow us to further strengthen our ties not only with the United States but also with Israel.”
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